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CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO COUNSEL AT
THE PRELIMINARY HEARING
I. INTRODUCTION
The United States Supreme Court recently decided, in Coleman
v. Alabama,' that it was constitutional error for a state to have de-
nied appointed counsel at the preliminary hearing2 of one accused
of a felony. The reasons given by the Court for this newly an-
nounced right, and the terms under which the vacated conviction
was remanded are likely to prove both surprising and troublesome
once their full effects are known.
Several leading 3 cases during the past decade have clearly
pointed the way toward this recently announced constitutional
right, and taken together they indicate why counsel has now been
declared an indispensable part of the preliminary hearing.
Proceeding along due process lines, 4 the Court in Hamilton v.
Alabama5 held an arraignment to be a "critical stage"6 in the crim-
inal proceedings because the defendant, unrepresented, had lost or
impaired his rights to plead insanity, to plead in abatement, and to
move to quash the indictment for improper grand jury selection
by not asserting these rights at the arraignment. Speaking of the
arraignment the Court said:
What happens there may affect the whole trial. Avail-
able defenses may be irretrievably lost.... When one
1. Coleman v. Alabama, U.S. ,90 S. Ct. 1999 (1970).
2. Terminology varies among jurisdictions. Here we are concerned
with the accused's appearance before a magistrate at which it will be de-
termined if an offense was committed, whether there is probable cause
to believe that the accused committed it, and if so, whether the offense is
bailable. See L. StVERSMN, DEFENSE OF THE POOR 87 n.1 (1965).
3. Hamilton v. Alabama, 368 U.S. 52 (1961) (see notes 4-5 infra and
accompanying text); White v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 59 (1963) (see note 8
infra and accompanying text); Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965) (see
notes 9-12 infra and accompanying text).
4. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV provides:
No state shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens
of the United States; nor shall any state deprive any person of
life, liberty, or property, without due process of law....
Id., § 1 (emphasis added). Hereinafter all references to United States
Constitutional Amendments in the text will be represented as "- amend-
ment".
5. 386 U.S. 52 (1961) (defendant, an emotionally unstable Negro, had
been given the death penalty upon conviction for breaking and entering
with intent to ravish). For background material on Hamilton see Chin
Kee v. Massachusetts, 407 F.2d 10, 11 n.1 (1st Cir. 1969).
6. See note 30 infra.
pleads to a capital charge, we do not stop to determine
whether prejudice resulted. . . In this case . . . the de-
gree of prejudice can never be known. Only the presence
of counsel could have enabled the accused to know all the
defenses available to him and to plead intelligently.
7
The conviction was reversed, White v. Maryland8 brought a Mary-
land "preliminary hearing" under the umbrella of the critical stage
doctrine because, although the defendant had lost no rights, as in
Hamilton, his guilty plea made at the preliminary hearing without
counsel was admitted into evidence at his trial, where he pleaded
not guilty. The Court, citing Hamilton, reversed the conviction.
In Pointer v. Texas9 a preliminary hearing was held critical be-
cause the complaining witness had left the state by the date of trial,
and a transcript of his testimony given at the preliminary hearing
was admitted into evidence at the trial. The Court held that since
the defendant was unrepresented at the hearing, the admission of
the transcript was a denial of his sixth amendment10 right to con-
front his accusers, applied to the states by the fourteenth amend-
ment.1  The conviction was reversed. Aside from the confronta-
tion right, the Court remarked in an obiter dictum:
Whether there might be other circumstances making
this Texas preliminary hearing so critical to the defendant
as to call for appointment of counsel at that stage we need
not decide on this record, and that question we reserve.
12
After the decisions in Hamilton, White, and Pointer, federal and
state courts generally tended to find that the preliminary hearing
was a critical stage requiring counsel if any evidence flowing from
the testimony of the defendant unrepresented at the hearing was
used at the trial;13 if the defendant's plea entered at the hearing
without representation was entered into evidence at the trial; 14 or
if lack of counsel at the preliminary hearing was in any sense preju-
dicial to the preparation of the defense at trial.
15
While the Supreme Court was thus homing in on the problem
of the preliminary hearing per se, via the fifth, sixth, and four-
teenth amendments, some commentators and analysts were advo-
cating the desirability of appointing counsel at the preliminary
hearing.16 Among the reasons advanced were egalitarian considera-
7. Hamilton v. Alabama, 368 U.S. 52, 54 (1961).
8. 373 U.S. 59 (1963) (defendant was given the death penalty for
first degree murder).
9. 380 U.S. 400 (1965) (complaint alleged robbery).
10. U.S. CONST. amend. VI provides:
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right
to a speedy and public trial, [and] to be confronted with the wit-
nesses against him. . ..
11. See note 4 supra.
12. 380 U.S. at 403.
13. See cases cited in Annot., 5 A.L.R.3d 1269, 1278-81, 1314-42 (1966).
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. See notes 17-21 infra.
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ations of the Gideon 7 genre,'" and because, it was urged, only coun-
sel could adequately represent the defendant's side of the probable
cause issue (e.g., by detecting evidence insufficiencies leading to a
reduction in the charge, or even to dismissal).19 Further, it was
argued, only counsel could enable the defendant to understand the
nature and gravity of the charges, and only counsel could ade-
quately exploit any discovery possibilities of the hearing and ef-
fectively cross-examine (and possibly later impeach) witnesses.
20
Other writers have felt that the resources invested in providing
counsel at the preliminary hearing could be better spent on im-
proving the quality of representation at trials and in promoting
earlier trials and reducing bail bonds.21 As of 1965, the year of the
decision in Pointer, sixteen states had statutory requirements for
counsel at the preliminary hearing. 22 Representation by counsel at
the preliminary hearing in federal prosecutions was mandated in
1964.21
Finally, five years after the Pointer decision, the question the
Court had "reserved" there24 presented itself squarely for deter-
mination in Coleman v. Alabama.25 Petitioners, tried and convicted
for assault with intent to murder, appealed, arguing that their pre-
liminary hearing was a critical stage of the prosecution, and that
the State's failure to appoint counsel unconstitutionally denied them
the assistance of counsel.26 The Court accepted the State's charac-
terization of the preliminary hearing as a hearing "to determine
whether there is sufficient evidence against the accused to warrant
17. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (all defendants in fel-
ony prosecutions must be represented by counsel, court-appointed if the de-
fendant is indigent).
18. See, e.g., Hunvald, Right to Counsel at the Preliminary Hearing,
31 Mo. L. REv. 109 (1966).
19. See, e.g., F. MILLER, PROSEcuTioN 78-82 (1969) [hereinafter cited as
MILLER]; Steinberg, Oh Where, Oh Where Will Gideon Go?, 25 U. PITT.
L. REv. 719, 728 (1963-64).
20. One study uncovered some instances in which lack of counsel
at the preliminary hearing was positively harmful to a defendant who
undertook his own cross-examination. MILLER at 73.
21. OAKS & LEHMAN, A CRImAL JUSTICE SYSTEMiv AND THE INDI-
GENT 51-53 (1968).
22. The Right to Counsel at the Preliminary Hearing, 32 J.B. Ass'N.
oF D.C. 293, 302 (1965).
23. Criminal Justice Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(c) (1964); FE. R. CPlM.
P. 44.
24. See text accompanying note 12 supra.
25. U.S. , 90 S. Ct. 1999 (1970). Petitioners raised two issues on
appeal. The first concerned alleged improper and prejudicial line-up
procedures before trial. The second concerned denial of counsel at the
preliminary hearing. This Note will discuss only the latter issue.
26. The precise constitutional basis of the holding is unclear. Mr. Jus-
presenting his case to the grand jury, and if so to fix bail if the of-
fense is bailable. '27 The Court noted that no defenses were lost
by failure to advance them at the hearing, and that no testimony
taken at the hearing was used at the trial (in conformance with
Pointer).28 Petitioners alleged no specific acts or omissions at the
hearing which resulted in prejudice at the trial, nor did they specify
in what regard counsel's absence at their trial was prejudicial to
their defense. 9 Nonetheless, the Court, through Mr. Justice Bren-
nan, found the preliminary hearing to be a critical stage"0 of the
prosecution at which counsel was constitutionally required 1
Building, inter alia, on the language of Powell v. Alabama,32 the
Court held:
Plainly the guiding hand of counsel at the preliminary
hearing is essential to protect the indigent accused against
an erroneous or improper prosecution. First, the lawyer's
skilled examination and cross-examination of witnesses
may expose fatal weaknesses in the State's case, that may
lead the magistrate to refuse to bind the accused over. Sec-
ond, in any event, the skilled interrogation of witnesses by
an experienced lawyer can fashion a vital impeachment
tool for use in cross-examination of the State's witnesses at
the trial, or preserve testimony favorable to the accused of
a witness who does not appear at the trial. Third, trained
counsel can more effectively discover the case the State has
against his client and make possible the preparation of a
tice Black, concurring, stated:
I fear that the Court's opinion seems at times to proceed on the
premise that the constitutional principle ultimately at stake here is
not the defendant's right to counsel as guaranteed by the Sixth
and Fourteenth amendments but rather a right to a 'fair trial' as
conceived by judges....
U.S. at -, 90 S. Ct. at 2005.
Mr. Justice Black would rest the Court's holding squarely on the sixth
amendment, as would Mr. Justice Douglas. Mr. Justice Harlan, concurring
in part, would apparently prefer a fifth and fourteenth amendment ap-
proach. Id. at , 90 S. Ct. at 2008 (concurring opinion). The majority
opinion is ambiguous.
27. Id. at , 90 S. Ct. at 2002.
28. See text accompanying notes 9-12 supra.
29. See dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Stewart, U.S. at , 90
S. Ct. at 2013.
30. The Court in Coleman v. Alabama, U.S. , 90 S. Ct. 1999
(1970), stated:
The determination whether the hearing is a 'critical stage' re-
quiring the provision of counsel depends, as noted, upon an analy-
sis 'whether potential substantial prejudice to defendant's rights
inheres in the ... confrontation and the ability of counsel to help
avoid that prejudice.'
Id. at , 90 S. Ct. at 2003.
31. Chief Justice Burger and Mr. Justice Stewart dissented.
32. 287 U.S. 45 (1932). The Court there held that: "[The defendant]
requires the guiding hand of counsel at every step in the proceelings
against him ... ." Id. at 69. When the particular details of this notorious
case are taken into account, the above language appears to be strictly lim-
ited in application. In this case no counsel was appointed until the ver-y
day of trial, even though the offense was capital, and even after counsel




proper defense to meet that case at trial. Fourth, counsel
can also be influential at the preliminary hearing in mak-
ing effective arguments on such matters as the necessity
for an early psychiatric examination or bail."
The convictions were not reversed, however, but were vacated, and
the case was remanded to the Alabama courts. The Court stated in
its remand order: "The test to be applied is whether the denial of
counsel at the preliminary hearing was harmless error under Chap-
man v. Calif ornia.34 . . ."5 The Court also pointed to United States
v. Wade36 and Gilbert v. California37 in the remand instructions.
38
Three questions arise from the Coleman decision: First, what
are the meaning and implications of the harmless error remand?
Second, what are the significance and implications of the four points
on which the Court based the constitutional requirement for coun-
sel at the preliminary hearing? Third, what is the status of the
preliminary hearing itself? This Note will discuss these questions.
I. MEANING AND IMPLICATIONS OF THE REMAND UNDER
CHAPMAN V. CALIFORNIA
A. Chapman v. California
Necessary to an understanding of the Chapman remand in
Coleman is an investigation of the holding in Chapman.3 9 In re-
sponse to the contention that constitutional error required reversal
per se, the Chapman court declared:
We are urged by petitioners to hold that all federal con-
stitutional errors, regardless of the facts and circumstances,
33. U.S. at , 90 S. Ct. at 2003.
34. 386 U.S. 18 (1967). See discussion under Section II of this Note,
infra.
35. Coleman v. Alabama, U.S. , 90 S. Ct. 1999, 2004 (1970).
36. United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967).
37. 388 U.S. 263 (1967).
38. U.S. at , 90 S. Ct. at 2004. The Court merely directed atten-
tion to Wade and Gilbert, without explanation. Wade and Gilbert were
argued together. The Court in both cases held that identification of the
defendant at a line-up was inadmissible unless counsel was present. Both
convictions were vacated and the cases were remanded under the Chapman
harmless-error test. The Court in Coleman referred to these two cases
in the remand as examples to follow in applying the harmless error test
to the denial of counsel. See notes 78 to 89 infra and accompanying text.
39. Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967). Petitioners were
convicted of kidnapping and murder. At their trial, which took place before
the Court's decision in Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609 (1965) (prosecu-
tor's remarks to jury on defendant's failure to testify in criminal trial held
a constitutional violation), the prosecutor commented extensively on peti-
tioners' failure to testify. Petitioners sought reversal on the ground that
the error, being constitutional, required automatic reversal; alternatively,
that the error was not harmless.
must always be deemed harmful. We decline to adopt any
such rule .... We conclude that there may be some consti-
tutional errors which in the setting of a particular case are
so unimportant and insignificant that they may be deemed
harmless, not requiring the automatic reversal of the con-
viction.
40
Turning next to the question of the proper test for harmless con-
stitutional error, the Court determined that the federal rule applies,
and stated that rule as requiring that "lIt] he court must be able to
declare a belief that [the error] was harmless beyond a reasonable
doubt. ' 4 1 The Court cited its language in Fahy v. Connecticut 4 2
by way of further elucidation: "... 'The question is whether there
is a reasonable possibility that the evidence complained of might
have contributed to the conviction.' . . ."3 Rejecting the "over-
whelming evidence" test for harmless error which the California
court had applied in Chapman,44 and substituting its own test, the
Court concluded finally that the State had not demonstrated "be-
yond a reasonable doubt, that the prosecutor's comments and the
trial judge's instructions did not contribute to petitioners' convic-
tions. ' 45 The convictions were reversed. This decision put the bur-
den of demonstrating the harmlessness of the error squarely on the
State.
46
In holding that not all constitutional errors require automatic
reversal, the Court established the first of what have since become
the opposite "poles"'47 around which constitutional errors are
grouped. The second pole, around which cluster those errors
which do require automatic reversal, emerged from a dictum in
Chapman. The Court cited certain "constitutional rights so basic
40. 386 U.S. at 21-22.
41. Id. at 24.
42. 375 U.S. 85, 86-87 (1963).
43. 386 U.S. at 23. The Court further stated: "... [A]n error in
admitting plainly relevant evidence which possibly influenced the jury
adversely to a litigant cannot . . .be conceived of as harmless ... " Id.
at 23-24.
44 .... The California constitutional rule emphasizes 'a miscar-
riage of justice', but the California courts have neutralized this to
some extent by emphasis, and perhaps overemphasis, upon the
court's view of 'overwhelming evidence'. We prefer the approach
of this Court....
Id. at 23 (footnotes omitted).
45. Id. at 26.
46. Id. at 24, 26.
47. See, e.g., Clark, Harmless Constitutional Error, 20 STANr. L. REV.
83, 88-89 (1967) [hereinafter cited as Clark]; Note, Harmless Constitutional
Error: A Reappraisal, 83 Anv. L. REV. 814, 817 (1970) [hereinafter cited
as Note I]. Other commentators have expressed doubt that a clear di-
chotomy was established, pointing to language in Chapman which they
feel raises the question whether "kinds" of error rather than "classes" of
error were the target in Chapman. See, e.g., HALL, KAMISAR, LAFAVE &
ISRAEL, MODERN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 537 (3d ed. 1969) [hereinafter cited as
HALL]; Mause, Harmless Constitutional Error: The Implications of Chap-




to a fair trial that their infraction can never be treated as harmless
error,"48 specifying coerced confessions, the right to counsel at trial,
and the right to an impartial judge.49 Mr. Justice Stewart, concur-
ring in the result, assented to this dichotomy but contended that
Griffin violations50 should fall into the automatically reversible
category.5 1 He indicated, however, that he would place fourth
amendment violations in the harmless error group.1
2
After Chapman, two immediate questions arose: How would
the new "reasonable doubt" standard be applied, and what criteria
would pull future constitutional errors toward one pole or the
other? The answers to these questions are the history of Chapman
to date, and whatever guidance is sought in applying the Chapman
test to Coleman must come if at all, from this history. It is sub-
mitted that, unfortunately, the history of Chapman sheds little
light on the problem of the Chapman remand in Coleman.
B. History of Chapman
In the first place, the Court's purported replacement of the
"overwhelming evidence" test in favor of the "reasonable doubt"
test has recently been questioned. 53 In Harrington v. California
5 4
the Court allowed a conviction to stand despite a violation of the
rule in Bruton v. United States5 5 because "the case against Har-
rington was so overwhelming .. " Three justices dissented, de-
crying the asserted "compromise" with the "firm resolve" of Chap-
man, which in the dissenters' view required the state to show that
that the error "must have made no contribution to a criminal
conviction. '57 The alleged compromise in Harrington, if indeed, it
48. 386 U.S. at 23 (concurring opinion).
49. Id. at 23 n.8.
50. Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609 (1965) (holding unconstitutional
the practice of prosecutors who comment on an accused's failure to testify
at his trial).
51. 386 U.S. at 45. See note 39 supra.
52. Id. at 44 n.2. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has concluded
that the Chapman test can also be applied to Miranda violations (Miranda
v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), failure to warn of rights before questioning).
Commonwealth v. Padgett, 428 Pa. 229, 237 A.2d 209 (1968).
53. Note I at 819-820.
54. 395 U.S. 250 (1969).
55. 391 U.S. 123 (1968) (barring confession of co-defendant implicat-
ing petitioner, where co-defendant did not testify).
56. 395 U.S. 250, 254.
57. Id. at 255 (dissenting opinion) (emphasis in original). Some pre-
Harrington commentators thought that the Chapman. "reasonable doubt"
test was likely to prove to be a more rigorous test than the "overwhelming
evidence" test it purportedly replaced. It was suggested that the Chapman
test might in practice be nearly tantamount to a rule of automatic reversal.
was a compromise,5" may have reflected the basis of the criticism
that the Chapman test was ill-suited to the achievement of the ob-
jective of the harmless error doctrine, judicial economy. 59 Mr. Jus-
tice Stewart, concurring in the Chapman result, preferred an auto-
matice reversal rule to the reasonable doubt test because he feared
that the latter "commits this Court to a case-by-case examination"
of errors, a "burdensome obligation" that he felt the Court was
unqualified to discharge.6 0 Indeed, some commentators concluded
that the Chapman rule might have a negative effect on judicial
economy. 61
The history of the application of the Chapman test to Griffin
violations62 provides an example of the difficulties and ambiguities
involved in attempting to apply the test to a given set of facts. 8
Some courts have held that improper comments by the prosecutor
require automatic reversal; 4 others have held that the error may be
harmless; 65 and still others have held that the error may be par-
tially harmless, requiring a new trial only on some of the issues
affected.
66
Those courts which have weighed the effects of the error to de-
termine if it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt have con-
sidered a wide range of factors: first, the nature and extent of the
comment; 67 second, the strength of the evidence of guilt aside from
the comment; s third, whether the defendant had waived his right
to complain by failure to make timely objection;6 9 fourth, whether
See Note, State and Federal Criminal Procedure, Harmless Constitutional
Error, 81 HARV. L. REV. 205, 207-08 (1967) [hereinafter cited as Note 1I].
Chief Justice Traynor of the California Supreme Court apparently thought
that the new test might be double-barrelled, requiring that the court must
first be convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that the result would not have
been different in the absence of the error, and secondly, requiring that
the court determine that the error could not have played any substantial
part in the jury's verdict. People v. Ross, 67 Cal. 2d 64, 429 P.2d 606
(1967) (dissenting opinion), rev'd per curiam, 391 U.S. 470 (1968). See
Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 764-65 (1946); Clark at 96; Annot.,
24 A.L.R.3d 1095, 1098-1099, 1109 (1969).
58. The majority opinion concluded: "We do not depart from Chap-
man; nor do we dilute it by inference. We reaffirm it ... " Harrington v.
California, 395 U.S. 250, 254 (1969).
59. The Chapman Court commented, "... what harmless-error rules
all aim at is a rule that will save the good in the harmless-error practice
while avoiding the bad, so far as possible." 386 U.S. at 22-23.
60. Id. at 45 (concurring opinion).
61. See, e.g., Mause at 520, 535, 540, 556; Note I at 207-08.
62. See note 50 supra.
63. See cases cited in Annot., 24 A.L.R.3d 1093 (1969). The editors
concluded elsewhere: "Judicial clarification of what is meant by an error
which 'contributed' to the verdict would appear to be of great value to liti-
gants...." Id. at 1009.
64. Id. at 1102-1104.
65. Id. at 1104-1108.
66. Id. at 1108-1109.
67. Id. at 1109-1111.
68. Id. at 1111-1118.
69. Id. at 1118-1120.
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the defendant invited the error by his own comments or conduct;
70
and, fifth, whether the trial judge cured the error by proper instruc-
tions to the jury to disregard the prosecutor's comments."' It is
suggested that the weighing of such factors as the second, third,
and fourth is inconsistent with the "no contribution" interpreta-
tion,7 2 and that the presence of the third, and possibly the fourth,
may be inconsistent with the "reasonable doubt" interpretation.73
While Harrington may be interpreted as giving the state courts
wider latitude, in exercising their first-line duty to determine if the
error was harmless, than was originally suggested by Chapman, one
recent commentator concluded:
. . . Thus, Chapman only established that some errors re-
quire automatic reversal and that the federal harmless-
error test applied to the remainder requires reversal if the
error is not shown harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
Chapman did not settle what the content of the federal test
is to be.
7 4
A second problem in attempting to apply the lessons of the
Chapman history to the facts in Coleman arises from the nature of
the error in Coleman.
C. Nature of the error in Coleman
The Chapman dicta, establishing the automatic reversal and
harmless error poles, 75 have led to attempts to analyze the bases
upon which errors can be grouped around one or the other of these
poles. Two distinguishing characteristics have tended to emerge
as common to the automatic reversal group: [the effect of the er-
ror] in the determination of guilt cannot be isolated, and the error
directly affects the trial-machinery or guilt-determination proc-
esses.7 6 One difficulty with the latter criterion is that it is difficult
70. Id. at 1120-1122.
71. Id. at 1122-1123.
72. See note 57 supra and accompanying text. If the question is
whether the comment made any contribution to the verdict, then the focus
of the inquiry should be on the nature of the comment, rather than on the
strength of other evidence. Similarly, questions of waiver and invitation of
the error by the defendant would appear to concern the provenance of the
error rather than its effect.
73. Even under the less rigorous "reasonable doubt" test, the circum-
stances under which the error arose would appear to beg the question of
the error's effect on the verdict. See note 57 supra and accompanying text.
74. Note I at 817.
75. See notes 47 to 52 supra and accompanying text.
76. See Clark at 88-90; Mause at 540-551; Note I at 820-824. These
commentators were unanimous in concluding that the denial of counsel, at
least in the Gideon context (Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963),
denial of counsel, felony trials), clearly qualified under these criteria for
automatic reversal, and one writer extended this analysis to include de-
to segregate those errors which do not affect the "trial machinery"
or "guilt-determining" process.77  Another problem is that the
Court seems to have implicitly rejected this approach by applying
the Chapman doctrine to Wade and Griffin violations, since both
identification at a line-up (Wade) and comments by a prosecutor on
the accused's failure to testify (Griffin) would appear to be inex-
tricably bound up in the trial-machinery or guilt-determination
complexes.78 Turning then to the first earmark of the automati-
cally-reversible error (effect of error indeterminable), as an exam-
ple of which Gideon v. Wainwright79 is cited by the Court in Chap-
man, 0 it comes as something of a surprise that Coleman was re-
manded under the Chapman doctrine.
In the first place, in comparing Coleman to Gideon, there is
the obvious analogy between a trial and a preliminary hearing in
respect to the adversary atmosphere and personnel. Secondly, it
would appear equally as true in Coleman as it was in Gideon that
the effect of the denial of counsel is indeterminable.8 ' While these
considerations may be only apparent anomalies, a further aspect
of the remand in Coleman goes to considerations of an even more
troublesome nature.
By pointing to Wade and Gilbert for guidance in applying the
Chapman test to the facts in Coleman,8 2 the Court apparently felt
that the differences in the fact situations in those cases were either
unimportant or surmountable. It is suggested that they may prove
to be neither. First, the necessity of counsel at a line-up was based
on protecting the defendant from the hazards of misidentifica-
tion. 83 And while it can be said that protecting the defendant from
nial of counsel at "a critical stage of the criminal proceeding." Note I
at 823.
77. Fourth amendment (search and seizure) violations of the Mapp
variety (Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961), illegal search) have been sug-
gested. Clark at 93-94; Mause at 548. It has also been suggested that
when deterrence of official misconduct is the basis for the exclusion of
evidence, the harmless-error standard should be applied. Mause at 557.
78. Two commentators have suggested that the Court's application of
the harmless-error test to Griffin violations may vitiate this analysis.
Clark at 90; Mause at 551.
79. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
80. See notes 49 and 76 supra and accompanying text.
81. Dissenting from the Chapman remand in Coleman, Mr. Justice
Harlan stated:
... In my opinion mere speculation that defense counsel might
have been able to do better at trial had he been present at the
preliminary hearing should not suffice to vitiate a conviction. The
Court's remand under the Chapman harmless error rule seems to
me to leave the way open for that sort of speculation.
U.S. at , 90 S. Ct. at 2009. See also the Court's language in Hamilton,
quoted in text accompanying note 7 supra.
82. U.S. at , 90 S. Ct. at 2004.
83. The Court in United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967) stated:
But the confrontation compelled by the state between the ac-
cused and the victim or witnesses to a crime to elicit identifica-
tion evidence is peculiarly riddled with innumerable dangers and
variable factors which might seriously, even crucially, derogate




a prosecution based on insufficient cause is to protect him from a
comparable danger of abuse by the state, that problem was clearly
mooted when the Coleman defendants were indicted, not to say con-
victed.8 4 The other reasons advanced by the Court in Coleman to
support a requirement of counsel at the hearing (examination of
witnesses, preservation of evidence, discovery, psychiatric exami-
nation and bail)s 5 do not appear comparable to the necessity of pro-
tecting the defendant against abuses by the state, since they largely
represent offensive opportunities for the accused.88
Two further points bearing on the problem of positioning
Coleman on the Wade-Gideon spectrum highlight the difficulties
in using Wade-Gilbert (rather than Gideon) as a guide in applying
the harmless error doctrine of Chapman to Coleman. First, as the
Court noted in Wade, presence of counsel was not the only means
the Court would approve in protecting the defendant against the
"dangers" of the line-up.8 7 But it is not likely that the Court in
Coleman entertained any similar notions with respect to counsel at
the preliminary hearing. Second, it is not clear how the limited
scope of the line-up, focusing on the narrow issue of identification,
can be compared with the much wider scope of the preliminary
hearing, involving the wide array of defense opportunities. s s
Wade, Gilbert, Chapman and Griffin, unlike Coleman, present a
specified error (the line-up identification, the prosecutor's com-
ments), and all the facts surrounding the error were in the record
when the convictions were reversed or vacated. In Coleman, how-
ever, petitioners did not aver in what specific respect they were
prejudiced by lack of counsel at their hearing. The amorphous na-
ture of the alleged prejudice, inter alia, led Mr. Justice Stewart to
84. See concurring opinion of Mr. Justice White, U.S. at , 90
S. Ct. at 2008, and dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Stewart, id. at , 90
S. Ct. at 2013.
85. See note 33 supra and accompanying text.
86. It might be argued that the defendant profits from a lineup if he
is not identified as the perpetrator, and that therefore the line-up is of at
least negative value to him. But such a benefit is fortuitous at best, and
it remains true that it is generally the police who institute line-ups for
their own purposes. Further, failure of the witnesses to identify will not
always operate to release the defendant (especially if the police have other
strong incriminatory evidence).
87. Legislative or other regulations, such as those of local po-
lice departments, which eliminate the risks of abuse and un-
intentional suggestion at line-up proceedings and the impediments
to meaningful confrontation at trial may also remove the basis for
regarding the stage as 'critical'. . . What we hold today 'in no
way creates a constitutional strait-jacket which will handicap
sound efforts at reform, nor is it intended to have this effect' .
388 U.S. at 239 (footnotes omitted).
88. See note 33 supra and accompanying text.
remark in his dissent in Coleman:
•.. All I can say is that if the Alabama courts can figure
out what they are supposed to do with this case now that it
has been remanded to them, their perceptiveness will far
exceed mine.8 9
Under such circumstances it is difficult to see how the directions
to Wade and Gilbert are likely to clarify the application of the
Chapman harmless error doctrine to the facts in Coleman.
D. Summary
Subsequent exposition of the Chapman harmless error test has
not led to a clarification of that test; on the contrary, it is question-
able if it is proper to speak of "the" test at all, and in any event,
whatever the test may be, it is easier to speak than to apply. Al-
though recent developments" may indicate at least a partial return
to some sort of "overwhelming evidence" test, possibly in con-
junction with a determination that the error did not contribute
(substantially?) to the verdict, the requirements of the rule are
not settled.
Because the factual situations in Gilbert and Wade differ in
many relevant respects from the factual situation in Coleman, these
cases are likely to be of limited value as guides in applying the
Chapman harmless error doctrine to Coleman. The only unambigu-
ous conclusion which can be drawn from Coleman is that failure to
appoint counsel at the preliminary hearing is not grounds for auto-
matic reversal.9 1
89. U.S. at , 90 S. Ct. at 2013 (dissenting opinion). Mr. Justice
Harlan and Mr. Justice White felt that any possible prejudice resolved
itself into the question of whether or not any testimony (from direct or
cross-examination) was lost which would have been of such weight at the
trial that its exclusion was reversible error, and which could have been
preserved through presence of counsel. Id. at , 90 S. Ct. at 2009 (con-
curring opinion). But no transcript was kept of the testimony at the hear-
ing, no evidence of variance was asserted, and, presumably, only the de-
fendant knows what his strategy was or would have been. Since the state
has the burden of demonstrating the harmlessness of the error, unless the
defense can come up with a material witness, absent at the trial, and
whose testimony would meet the above standards, the remand would seem
futile. Mr. Justice Stewart, dissenting, felt that the remand was futile re-
gardless of who has the burden. Id. at , 90 S. Ct. at 2013 (dissenting
opinion). See also Harris v. Wainwright, 406 F.2d 1 (5th Cir. 1969) (a pre-
Coleman case in which the burden of disproving prejudice was put on the
state).
90. E.g., Harrington v. California, 395 U.S. 250 (1969). See notes 54 to
58 supra and accompanying text.
91. In passing, a word might be mentioned of an ingenious suggestion
that the Court's Chapman rule might possibly be a retroactivity device
designed to avoid the pitfalls of its experiments with retrospective-
prospective applications of its decisions. Johnson, Forward to the Supreme
Court of California 1967-68: Retroactivity in Retrospect, 56 CAL. L. REV.
1612, 1631-32 (1968). Unfortunately, subsequent events undermine this
interesting interpretation. See, e.g., the history of the Griffin cases, Annot.,
24 A.L.R.3d 1093 (1969).
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III. THE COLEMAN RATIONALE
Equally as important as the meaning and implications of the
Chapman remand itself are the significance and implications of the
four reasons the Court gave for its decision that counsel is required
at the preliminary hearing. An analysis of the reasons why a pre-
liminary hearing is a critical stage requiring counsel is essential if it
must be determined when the hearing may not be critical. Obvi-
ously a general requirement of counsel at all felony 92 preliminary
hearings would impose a significantly greater financial burden on
the states.93 If it can be foretold when a preliminary hearing may
not be a critical stage, the expense of appointed counsel could be
saved. That this is not a merely academic problem, at least in some
states, is suggested by the following comment which is appended to
Rule 318 of the Pennsylvania Rules of Criminal Procedure.9 4 Speak-
ing of the requirement for counsel in noncapital cases, the comment
states:
... An ideal rule would authorize the appointment of
counsel even at the preliminary hearing stage. However,
the impossibility of being able to make such a provision
work is readily recognized. There are approximately five
thousand issuing authorities throughout the State who
accept complaints and hold hearings at almost every hour
of the day and night. To require counsel to be appointed
by a court of record to attend proceedings before the mi-
nor judiciary-in some instances many miles away-just
would not work....
But even though a state may choose to bear the expense of appoint-
ing counsel in all felony preliminary hearings an analysis of the
Coleman Court's reasons for holding a preliminary hearing a criti-
cal stage is still required in order for a court to competently de-
cide future appeals in cases where an accused has been denied coun-
sel at the preliminary hearing.95
92. The defendants in Coleman were convicted of assault with intent
to murder. U.S. at , 90 S. Ct. at 2000. There is no reason to suppose
that the ruling extends to minor offenses, since the Gideon rule does not
extend that far, and it is not likely that an accused would be entitled to
appointed counsel at his preliminary hearing where no such requirement
prevails at the trial.
93. See PRESmENT'S ComuiwssoN ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMIN-
ISTRATION OF JUSTICE, TASK FORCE REPORT: THE COURTS, 153, 158-161 (1967).
A recent newspaper item reported that a requirement for appointed counsel
and hearing transcripts at Allegheny County (Pittsburgh, Pa.) preliminary
hearings under the Coleman rule would require an additional twelve full-
time attorneys, two investigators and three secretaries, at a cost of $215,000.
Pittsburgh Post-Gazette, Sept. 25, 1970, § 2 at 17.
94. PA. R. Crim. P. 318, comment thereto.
95. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has held that, absent exceptional
The four reasons the Court gave for characterizing the Ala-
bama preliminary hearing as a critical stage96 may be ramified into
five elements for purposes of discussion: determination of probable
cause, impeachment of witnesses, preserving testimony, discovery,
and psychiatric examination and bail. It is submitted that an ex-
amination of these elements reveals that either as a description of
the preliminary hearing 97 or as a basis for asserting error, the
Court's four points are beset with difficulties.
A. Probable cause-the bindover standard
The magistrate's duty to bind the accused over to the grand
jury for indictment if he determines that a crime has been com-
mitted and that there is probable cause for believing that the ac-
cused committed it, can be looked at from two points of view: the
stronger the standard, the less risk that an accused will be subjected
to an unfounded prosecution; the stronger the standard, the greater
the scope of the hearing. It is suggested that the requirement for
counsel varies directly with the strength of the bindover standard
and the scope of the hearing.
Generally speaking, bindover standards might be characterized
as simple probable cause9 s and probable cause prima facie 9 stand-
ards, 0 0 the distinction being primarily one of the interpretation giv-
en to the magistrate's duty.110 If it is the practice for the magistrate
or extraordinary circumstances, the preliminary hearing is not a critical
stage requiring counsel. Commonwealth ex rel. Mount v. Rundle, 425
Pa. 312, 228 A.2d 640 (1967), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 875 (1967). The United
States Supreme Court in Coleman did not indicate the retroactive extent
of its decision, although there is some indication from lower pre-Coleman
courts which anticipated the retroactivity problem that the new rule may
be applied retroactively. 5 A.L.R.3d 1269, 1281-82 (1966).
96. See note 33 supra and accompanying text.
97. General provisions governing the Alabama preliminary hearing
may be found in ALA. CODE tit. 15, §§ 119-151 (1958). The Coleman Court
based its opinion on a description of the Alabama hearing as one to "deter-
mine whether there is sufficient evidence against the accused to warrant
presenting his case to the grand jury and if so to fix bail. . . ." U.S.
at , 90 S. Ct. at 2002. There is no indication in the opinion that the
Court's four points were based on other than this general description of the
hearing. Other state courts characterize their preliminary hearings in
similar terms. See, e.g., State v. Evans, Ia. , 169 N.W.2d 200 (1969);
State v. Minamyer, 12 Ohio St. 67, 232 N.E.2d 401 (1967); Commonwealth
ex rel. Maisenhelder v. Rundle, 414 Pa. 11, 198 A.2d 568 (1964). Conse-
quently, there is no reason to suppose that the Court's opinion in Coleman
was based on any peculiarities of the Alabama hearing.
98. See, e.g., FED. R. CalM. P. 5(c) (". . . If from the evidence it
appears ... that there is probable cause .. "); Mo. CRIM. P.R. 23.08
(". . . If upon examination of the whole matter [there appears] probable
cause .. ").
99. See, e.g., PA. R. Cam. P. 123 ("If the Commonwealth establishes
a prima facie case .... ").
100. Other formulations are encountered, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 872
(West 1970) ("sufficient cause"); IOWA CODE § 761.18 (1966) ("sufficient
reason").
101. MmLFa at 88-94. One commentator has concluded that in general
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to bind the accused over once the state has presented a prima facie
case, without regard to credibility of witnesses or the likelihood of
conviction at trial,102 the defendant's opportunity to rebut the
state's case, and the scope of the hearing itself103 are rather limited.
If, on the other hand, it is the practice for the magistrate to bind
the accused over only when the evidence indicates that a jury would
probably convict, both the defendant's affirmative role and the
scope of the hearing are likely to be larger. Indeed, one writer has
concluded that the likelihood that the hearing will become a criti-
cal stage requiring counsel may vary directly with the extent to
which the "likelihood of conviction" standard prevails over the
"probably guilty" standard. 0 4 Certainly if the rules of evidence
were to apply at the hearing,1 - a stronger argument could be made
for requiring counsel. 1 6 But where the state need merely prove
a prima facie case, or where, regardless of the verbal formula, the
magistrate credits only the state's case, 107 the effect of counsel on
the state has a "relatively slight" burden of proof to establish probable
cause. Note, The Preliminary Hearing-An Interest Analysis, 51 IA. L.
REV. 164, 167-168, 168 n.24 (1965-66).
102. The United States Supreme Court has held that it is not the func-
tion of the magistrate to adjudicate the admissibility of evidence at trial.
Giordenello v. United States, 357 U.S. 480, 484 (1958). See Rideout v.
Superior Court, 67 Cal. 2d 471, 474, 432 P.2d 197, 199 (1967) ("Evidence that
will justify a prosecution need not be sufficient to support a conviction.
. . ."). However, the court also noted that the magistrate may determine
the credibility of witnesses. Id. at 472 n.2, 432 P.2d at 198 n.2; Smith v.
O'Brien, N.H. , , 251 A.2d 323, 324 (1969) (magistrate not called
upon to reconcile conflicting testimony or to judge the credibility of wit-
nesses).
103. The United States Supreme Court has recently taken note that
the preliminary hearing is of much more limited scope than the trial.
Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719, 725 (1968) ("much less searching explora-
tion into the merits").
104. MILLER at 94.
105. Presently, the rules of evidence do not apply at federal preliminary
hearings. 1 L. ORFIELD, CRIMINAL PROCFDUE UNDER THE FEDERAL RULES
265-266 (1966). But the Proposed Rules of Evidence for United States
district courts and magistrates recommends that this practice be reversed.
46 F.R.D. 161, 426 (1969). State practices vary, the majority holding that
the rules do not apply. See HALL at 856; MILLER at 94-101.
106. Most federal magistrates to be appointed under the Federal Mag-
istrates Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3060 (1968), will probably be attorneys. Weinberg
& Weinberg, The Congressional Invitation to Avoid the Preliminary
Hearing, 67 MIcn. L. REV. 1361, 1386 n.106 (1969) [hereinafter cited as
Weinberg]. Many state magistrates are not attorneys. Because of the
complexities in administering the rules, it is unlikely that their imposition
upon non-lawyer magistrates would be effective. See HALL at 856; Note,
The Preliminary Hearing-An Interest Analysis, 51 IA. L. REV. 164, 178
(1965-66); Note, Preliminary Hearings on Indictable Offenses in Phila-
delphia, 106 U. PA. L. REv. 589, 592-593, 601 (1957-58).
107. MILLER at 76-77 & n.50.
having charges dismissed is likely to be small. One study revealed
that typically only two per cent of the cases before magistrates were
dismissed, 10 8 either because of the low bindover standard or be-
cause of good pre-hearing screening by the prosecutor.10 9 It is
questionable whether the presence of counsel is likely to lead to
more dismissals,110 especially if magistrates, acting within the ap-
parent scope of their authority, bind over for more esoteric rea-
sons.11 '
But whatever policy arguments may be derived from the his-
tory of the preliminary hearing in practice," 2 logic indicates that the
problem of probable cause is not likely to generate constitutional
errors. If the grand jury indicts-or at least, as in Coleman,
if defendants are convicted-the issue is mooted,"13 and between
the time of the hearing and the indictment the defendant may ap-
ply for a writ of habeas corpus. Consequently, alleged abuses of
the bindover standard would not normally be asserted as error
after conviction, and the presence of counsel, therefore, becomes ir-
relevant.
B. Impeachment of Witnesses
Generally speaking, the accused, if he seeks to impeach a wit-
ness, must have the right to confront the witness, the right to
cross-examine, and the right to have a transcript of the testimony.
In practice, however, the accused may have none or less than all of
these rights.
Where the practice of the prosecutor is to present the arresting
108. Id. at 84. Other studies report that as many as 43% of the cases
are dismissed in some jurisdictions. HALL at 850. Statistics are not gener-
ally comparable unless reduced to hearings on the merits in felony cases,
and abstracting from all others.
109. MILLER at 83.
110. . . . Most defense counsel visibly regard the motion to dismiss
as a formality, holding no hope, in the typical case, for a favorable
ruling....
Id. at 77. However, the author later states: "... [I]t must be assumed
that some preliminary hearings are 'perfunctory' simply because defense
counsel was not present to perceive the problems." Id. at 81-82. Statistics
on waiver rates in the federal courts show no decline since 1964 when coun-
sel was first provided at the preliminary hearing. See generally HALL at
863, 849 n."e". There is also no evidence of any increase in the number
of dismissals. Id.
111. See Note, Preliminary Hearings on Indictable Offenses in Phila-
delphia, 106 U. PA. L. REv. 589, 601 (1957-58).
112. Chief Justice Burger, in Coleman, stated:
I agree that as a matter of sound policy counsel should be made
available to all persons subjected to a preliminary hearing....
However, I cannot accept the notion that the Constitution com-
mands it because it is a 'criminal prosecution'....
U.S. at , 90 S. Ct. at 2010 (dissenting opinion) (emphasis in
original) (footnotes omitted).
113. See Jennings v. Superior Court, 166 Cal. 2d 867, 428 P.2d 304
(1967) (defendant must appeal alleged errors at the preliminary hearing on
a writ of prohibition, before trial on the merits which usually cures the
error). See also note 177 infra and accompanying text.
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officer as the chief witness against the accused, and to follow a
policy of keeping the number of witnesses to a minimum,114 the
accused's opportunities to cross-examine are limited. To the extent
that the rules of evidence are not observed,11 5 especially in regard
to hearsay testimony,"' the accused's opportunity to confront the
witnesses is restricted.
Statutory provisions generally provide either that the accused
must cross-examine prosecution witnesses, 17 or that the magistrate
may examine all witnesses who appear."" There is some evidence
that in those jurisdictions which permit cross-examination, while in
general defendants were given maximal opportunity to cross-ex-
amine, some magistrates tend to restrict the practice after they have
become convinced that there is probable cause." 9  To the extent
that the bindover standard is based on probability of guilt rather
than convictability at trial, 120 and to the extent that only a prima
facie case need be made out,12 certainly cross-examination oppor-
tunities will be minimal.
But even if the defense is permitted to cross-examine witnesses,
the value of the privilege in terms of impeachment may be reduced
114. See, e.g., MILLER at 67-68; 1 L. ORFiL, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE UNDER
THE FEDERAL RULES 261-262 (1966).
115. See note 105 supra and accompanying text.
116. See MILLER at 96-101. In People v. Asta, 337 Mich. 590, 60
N.W.2d 472 (1953), the court sustained an objection made at the prelimi-
nary hearing to an investigating officer's testimony to what an informer
told him as hearsay. But in Costello v. United States, 350 U.S. 359 (1956)
the Supreme Court allowed a grand jury indictment based wholly on
hearsay evidence to stand. It has been suggested that the ruling would
extend to the preliminary hearing. MILLER at 97. It would seem contra-
dictory to allow hearsay at the grand jury proceeding, where the decision
to subject the accused to prosecution is ultimately made, but to disallow it at
the preliminary hearing, where the accused is subject only to being bound
over. But see Advisory Committee's Note, Preliminary Draft of Proposed
Rules of Evidence for the United States District Courts and Magistrates,
46 F.R.D. 161, 426 (1969). See also 8 J. MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE (2nd ed.
1970) 1 5.04 at 5-43 to 5-44, 5-44 n.41 (1969) [hereinafter cited as MOORE].
It has been reported that hearsay is greatly relied upon at preliminary
hearings (Weinberg at 1384), and that statutes requiring confrontation have
been interpreted as merely "directory" in nature. Note, The Preliminary
Hearing-An Interest Analysis, 51 IA. L. REV. 164 (1965-66).
117. See, e.g., FED. R. CRIM. P. 5(c); CAL. PENAL CODE § 865 (West
1970); ME CRIM. P.R. 5(c).
118. See, e.g., IowA CODE § 761.7 (1966).
119. See, e.g., MILLER at 71-73, 71 n.27, 72 n.30; Note, The Preliminary
Hearing-An Interest Analysis, 51 IA. L. REV. 164, 177 (1965-66); Note, Pre-
liminary Hearings on Indictable Offenses in Philadelphia, 106 U. PA. L.
REv. 589, 592-593 (1957-58).
120. See notes 101-104 supra and accompanying text.
121. See notes 99-100 supra and accompanying text.
to nearly nothing if no transcript of the testimony is made. 2 '
Some, but by no means all, jurisdictions require transcriptions of
testimony.12 8 And, whereas under federal law indigents are en-
titled to free transcripts of testimony,124 in some jurisdictions such
transcripts are only available at the expense of the accused.1 25 Con-
sequently, where the accused's opportunity to cross-examine is
small, and especially where no transcript is made, it would be possi-
ble to argue that there was minimal opportunity to impeach wit-
nesses, hence no "reasonable doubt" that counsel's absence was not
error.
C. Preserving testimony
The Coleman Court spoke of preserving testimony of witnesses
who did not appear at the trial.' -2 6 In regard to adverse witnesses1 27
this possibility would seem to depend in large measure upon
whether the defendant could have compelled their direct testimony,
or elicited the information on cross-examination, at the hearing.
The difficulty in the latter case has been mentioned,1 2 8 and there is
no general right to subpoena prosecution witnesses.129 In regard
to subpoenaing witnesses, adverse or friendly,1 30 while most stat-
utes give the accused a right to call his own witnesses, '1 in Penn-
sylvania the accused may not testify or call his own witnesses 32
122. MOORE 5.04 at 5-44 to 5-45. No transcript was made in Coleman,
U.S. at , 90 S. Ct. at 2013. Ironically, the Alabama Code had pro-
vided that testimony of witnesses must be reduced to writing. ALA. CODE
tit. 15, § 135 (1958) (repealed 1969).
123. Transcripts of testimony are required in federal preliminary
hearings. Federal Magistrates Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3060(f) (1968). This is the
case in California if either side requests a transcript. CAL. PENAL CODE
§ 869 (West 1970). In contrast, the Pennsylvania Rules of Criminal Pro-
cedure do not require a transcription of testimony, or even a magistrate's
notes on the testimony. PA. R. CaM. P. 125-126.
124. Federal Magistrates Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3060 (f) (1968).
125. See, e.g., PA. R. CalM. P. 120.
126. U.S. at , 90 S. Ct. at 2003.
127. Mr. Justice White, concurring, spoke of preserving testimony
elicited on either direct or cross-examination. U.S. at , 90 S. Ct. at
2008 (concurring opinion).
128. See notes 117-121 supra and accompanying text.
129. See HALL at 860. Cf. PA. R. CRiM. P. 310.
130. See R. CIPEs, CRIMINAL DEFENSE TECHNIQUES § 10.06 at 10-41 to
10-42, 10-42 n.119 (1969) [hereinafter cited as CIPES]; Note, The Preliminary
Hearing-An Interest Analysis, 51 IA. L. REV. 164, 170, 179 (1965-66). But
see Washington v. Clemmer, 339 F.2d 715 (D.C. Cir. 1964). In Clemmer
the court held that the accused was entitled to an indigent subpoena of
a rape victim, who, the accused asserted, would fail to identify him as
an accomplice if she appeared at the preliminary hearing. The District
of Columbia Circuit is not typical in its attitudes toward the preliminary
hearing, and in fact is the only circuit which adheres to its peculiar no-
tions. See notes 139-145 infra and accompanying text.
131. Mr. Justice Harlan, concurring in part, speaks of "favorable tes-
timony," and the presentation of an "affirmative case." U.S. at , 90
S. Ct. at 2009 (concurring opinion).
132. See, e.g., FED. R. Cium. P. 5(c); CAL. PENAL CODE § 866 (West
1970); Mo. CRi. P.R. 23.03.
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when the charge is murder, voluntary manslaughter, kidnapping,
arson, robbery, or burglary. 13 3 It has been pointed out 13 4 that un-
der some prevailing practices 3 5 the assertion of error because of op-
portunities allegedly lost through failure to cross-examine is not
likely to prevail. And certainly where, as in Pennsylvania, the de-
fendant is prohibited from testifying or presenting his own wit-
nesses in the case of specified charges, there would be no ground
for asserting error on the grounds that counsel might have been
able to preserve favorable testimony of defense witnesses.
D. Discovery
While it may be that discovery is an objective of the defense at
the preliminary hearing,13 6 or that the preliminary hearing may be
the accused's best or only opportunity to confront the state's wit-
nesses (or at least some of them) before trial,137 it remains true that
a large body of authoritative opinion disapproves of the hearing as
a discovery device.1 3s
The argument over discovery in federal courts came to a boil
in the 1967 District of Columbia case of Ross v. Sirica.129 Reexam-
ining the contention that denial of discovery at the preliminary
hearing level constituted grounds for a new trial, the majority posi-
tion 140 was that determination of probable cause was the purpose of
the hearing, and that discovery was merely an "inevitable conse-
quence.' 41  The court felt that discovery was best treated sep-
133. PA. R. CRiM. P. 120(b).
134. See text following note 125 supra.
135. In addition to the fact that transcripts are not provided in Penn-
sylvania, note 125 supra, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court is not likely to
be receptive to the argument that favorable testimony was lost because of
failure to cross-examine, since the court disapproves of criminal discovery
in general. See Commonwealth v. Caplan, 411 Pa. 563, 192 A.2d 894 (1963).
136. See, e.g., HALL at 848; MILLER at 74, 76; Weinberg at 1365. See
also United States ex Tel. Wheeler v. Flood, 269 F. Supp. 194, 198 (E.D.
N.Y. 1967).
137. CiPES § 10.06 at 10-41.
138. See notes 139-160 infra and accompanying text.
139. 380 F.2d 557 (D.C. Cir. 1967). In Blue v. United States, 342 F.2d
894 (D.C. Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 944 (1965), the circuit court had
suggested that where a defendant had been surprised at his trial by
evidence he might have obtained at a preliminary hearing had he been
given one, he was entitled to a new trial. This suggestion that discovery
was a right to which the defendant was entitled has not been followed in
any other circuit. MOORE 5.04 at 5-36, and was rejected by the D.C. Cir-
cuit in Ross (see text accompanying notes 140-145 infra).
140. See MOORE 5.04 at 5-36 to 5-42 (the "majority' 'position has been
derived from several hearings on the same case).
141. 380 F.2d at 563.
arately.142 The majority stated, however, that it might compel a
preliminary hearing if the prosecutor purposefully sought to de-
lay the hearing, 143 or where the government attempted to withhold
a key witness.1 44 But these two exceptions are the furthest the
District of Columbia Circuit was prepared to go in supporting the
discovery cause, and even this modest advance was expressly re-
jected by the Second Circuit the same year.145 Discovery as a right
of the accused has not become established at the preliminary hear-
ing in the federal courts.
Recognizing discovery as an objective of the preliminary hear-
ing has also not found favor with Congress. 46 The Senate com-
mittee 147 which held hearings on The Federal Magistrates Act
4
1
rejected the idea that discovery should be considered an objective
of the preliminary hearing. The reasons given were the lack of
uniformity in the defendant's ability to obtain a hearing, 49 the
variable and limited amount of evidence offered by the Govern-
ment,1 ,50 and the assertion that the preliminary hearing takes place
too soon after arrest to allow the defense time to benefit from dis-
covery.1 51
Many state courts deny that discovery is a recognized purpose
of the preliminary hearing, 1 2 and some take the position that any
142. Id. at 564.
143. Id. at 563-564. But since the Federal Magistrates Act, 18 U.S.C.
§ 3060 (1968), provides that the defendant shall be released from custody
where the government fails to prosecute within the period prescribed (see
note 151 infra), it could be argued that this is the exclusive remedy. See
MOORE 5.04 at 11-12. See also notes 177-179 infra.
144. 380 F.2d at 563-564.
145. Sciortino v. Zampano, 385 F.2d 132 (2d Cir. 1967). One commen-
tator notes, however, that the rejection was not compelled by the facts in
Sciortino. MooRE 5.04 at 5-42.
146. Weinberg at 1390.
147. Senate Subcommittee on Improvements in Judicial Machinery. S.
REP. No. 371, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. (1965), discussed in Weinberg at 1372-
1402.
148. Federal Magistrates Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3060 (1968).
149. Weinberg at 1390 (referring to the fact that the hearing may be
superseded by an indictment).
150. Id. at 1391.
151. Id. Under federal law the hearing must take place within ten
or twenty days, depending upon whether the accused is free on bail,
whether he gives his consent to the delay, and whether a district court
approves postponement because of "extraordinary" circumstances. Federal
Magistrates Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3060 (1968). State practices vary. The
hearing is held at periods ranging from the same day as arrest to more
than thirty days after arrest. L. SILVERSTEIN, DEFsNSE OF THE POOR 76-79
(1965).
Another reason given for denying that discovery has a place at the
preliminary hearing is that the defendant may be indicted on charges other
than those on which he is bound over. Ross v. Sirica, 380 F.2d 557, 564
(1967) (citing the findings of the Senate Subcommittee on Improvements
in Judicial Machinery, notes 146-151 supra and accompanying text).
152. See, e.g., Martinez v. State, 423 P.2d 700, 711 (Alas. 1967); Timbers
v. State, 2 Md. App. 672, 673, 236 A.2d 756, 757 (1968); State v. Kanistan-
aux, 68 Wash. 2d 652, 658-659, 414 P.2d 784, 788-789 (1966); Whitty v.
State, 34 Wis. 2d 278, 287, 149 N.W.2d 557, 560 (1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S.
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form of pre-trial criminal discovery should be discouraged.'1" Some
authorities believe that discovery is best treated separately from
the preliminary hearing,154 or that, in any event, the preliminary
hearing as presently conducted is a poor discovery device.
1 5
Thus, the great majority of courts would be unlikely to enter-
tain the contention that error was committed at a preliminary hear-
ing because discovery per se was curtailed or not permitted. Since
discovery is only an incidental benefit (where it occurs at all), it is
unlikely that it could constitute an independent' 5 6 basis for alleged
error; consequently it is possible to argue that counsel's efforts in
this regard would have had no appreciable effect on the trial.
157
This Note will not discuss the problems of psychiatric examina-
tion and bail, since both could be dealt with outside the framework
of the preliminary hearing,158 and because neither seems to be in-
separable from the problem of the "erroneous or improper prose-
cution" 911-the putative target of the Coleman court.
160
959 (1968). But see In re Mortimer, 192 Kan. 164, 166, 386 P.2d 261, 263
(1963) (stating that one of the purposes of the preliminary hearing is "to
apprise [defendant] partially, at least, of the sort of evidence he will have
to combat. . . in. . . court. .. ").
153. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Caplan, 411 Pa. 563, 192 A.2d 894
(1963).
154. See, e.g., Coleman v. Alabama, U.S. , , 90 S. Ct. 1999,
2011-12 (1970) (dissenting opinion of Chief Justice Burger); Ross v. Sir-
ica, 380 F.2d 557, 564 (1967); S. REP. No. 371, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. (1965);
Cf. MILLER at 133-134.
155. See, e.g., Cips § li.01 at 11-3 to 11-7. Cf. HALL at 849.
156. To the extent that discovery is an incidental benefit ("inevitable
consequence," note 141 and accompanying text supra) deriving from ex-
amination or cross-examination of witnesses, or from the general scope of
the evidence presented at the hearing, it suffers the same limitations.
157. It could also be argued that to the extent that other discovery de-
vices are available (e.g., depositions, pre-trial conferences, bills of par-
ticulars, etc.), lack of discovery opportunities at the preliminary hearing is
remediable.
158. Bail problems would appear to be analogous to the bindover prob-
lem, i.e., they are not likely to constitute a basis of appeal after conviction.
Cf. notes 95-96 supra and accompanying text. It is not clear why the Court
included psychiatric examinations, since they would be available at any
time before conviction.
159. Coleman v. Alabama, U.S. , , 90 S. Ct. 1999, 2003 (1970).
Mr. Justice White, concurring, stated: "... So too it seems extremely un-
likely that matters related to bail or early psychiatric examination would
ever raise reasonable doubts about the integrity of the trial." Id. at
90 S. Ct. at 2008.
160. Mr. Justice Stewart, dissenting, wondered whether a fair trial
was the objective:
But the Court holds today that the Constitution required Ala-
bama to provide a lawyer for the petitioners at their preliminary
hearing, not so much, it seems, to assure a fair trial as to assure
a fair preliminary hearing.
U.S. at , 90 S. Ct. at 2013.
E. Summary
In assessing the likelihood that lack of counsel at the prelimi-
nary hearing would be found harmless on appeal, it should be pos-
sible to ignore any improprieties in the decision to bind over, psychi-
atric examinations and bail. These problems are either mooted or
curable before the appellate stage. Of the remaining reasons
given by the Coleman court for holding the preliminary hearing a
critical stage requiring counsel, in those jurisdictions where oppor-
tunities to cross-examine, to present defense witnesses, and to dis-
cover are limited or non-existent, it may be difficult to show that
counsel's absence was harmful even to a reasonable doubt. Conse-
quently, there may be many instances where the states may avoid
the expense of appointed counsel,1 6' or where failure to appoint
counsel will not result in reversal of convictions.
Finally, since there is no indication that the Court's four points
in Coleman were intended to be prescriptive rather than descrip-
tive, 1 2 in case there were any doubt about whether a state's pre-
liminary hearing might prove "critical," thus requiring counsel un-
der the Coleman doctrine, there would appear to be no reason why
the state could not act affirmatively to cure this defect by amend-
ing its procedures at the hearing. In Pennsylvania, for example, it
has been noted that one accused of specified felonies is not permit-
ted to present his own witnesses or to testify,' 63 thereby preclud-
ing the possibility that counsel could have "preserved" any testi-
mony of witnesses for the accused. Other statutory changes could
restrict the opportunities of the accused so that the probability of a
harmful error is minimized. This reasoning clearly presumes the
status quo, i.e., that the states are free to define their preliminary
If a fair preliminary hearing was really the objective of Coleman, the
result would appear to have been accomplished by a strangely saltatory
process of reasoning, since, as this Note has attempted to show, the
Court's description (see text accompanying note 162 infra) of the prelimi-
nary hearing is inconsistent with much state and federal practice, and
since, as will be seen, there is no constitutional necessity for the hearing
itself (see note 165 infra).
161. It is reported that as of 1965, eleven states and the District of
Columbia usually appointed counsel at or before the preliminary hearing;
twenty-one states usually did not; and in seventeen states the practices
varied. L. SILVERSTEIN, DEFENSsE OF THE POOR 75 (1965). Another possibility
is that states could institute a procedure modeled on that of Michigan
and Wisconsin, where, upon demand by the defendant, his cause may be
remanded to a magistrate for a preliminary hearing under certain condi-
tions (that the hearing was waived without advice of counsel, that de-
fendant denies that probable cause exists to hold him, and that defendant
intends to plead not guilty). MILLER at 129-132. By reducing the condi-
tions to one condition, namely, that the defendant was unrepresented, states
might be able to comply with the Coleman decision, where it is felt that
the omission of counsel might have been harmful under Coleman. But it is
questionable if this procedure would really result in any economy of re-
sources. Id. at 131 n.76, 136.
162. See note 160 supra.




IV. THE CONSTITUTIONAL STATUS OF THE PRELIMINARY HEARING
Before coming to any general conclusions about the ramifica-
tions of Coleman, it would be prudent to note briefly the present
constitutional status of the preliminary hearing. The discussion
thus far has implicitly assumed that prior to trial a preliminary
hearing will take place, but this assumption is misleading.
There is no constitutional right to a preliminary hearing.1 5
The preliminary hearing is entirely the creature of statute,166 and,
in practice, the hearing may be avoided entirely in many instances.
First, the right to a preliminary hearing can be waived by the
accused, either expressly or by a plea of guilty to the warrant. The
accused may expressly waive his right to a preliminary hearing
with 1 67 or without 168 the advice of counsel. Waiver on advice of
counsel must be taken to be in the best interests of the accused, but
where the waiver is made without counsel the problem of the in-
telligent waiver arises. 16 9 In light of the Coleman decision it is
doubtful that waiver without counsel would be held constitu-
tional. 70 Most of the elements 71 on which the critical stage deter-
mination rested in Coleman represented advantages to the ac-
cused,' 7 2 and it is doubtful that the accused is generally in a posi-
tion to understand their importance. A further problem arises
where the decision to waive is made at the initial appearance, or at
least before the preliminary hearing itself, 3' since few jurisdictions
164. The irony implicit in this "solution" to the Coleman problem is
pointed out in Section V of this Note, infra.
165. United States ex rel. Hughes v. Gault, 271 U.S. 142 (1926). Mr.
Justice Holmes put it succinctly: "The Constitution does not require
any preliminary hearing before a person charged with a crime against
the United States is brought into the court having jurisdiction.
Id. at 149.
166. No jurisdiction has been discovered where provision for some sort
of preliminary hearing has not been made by statute.
167. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 860 (West 1970); Mo. CrM. P.R.
23.02. An accused is deemed to have waived with counsel the right to a
preliminary hearing where he had previously and properly waived the
right to counsel.
168, See, e.g., PA. R. Calm. P. 119. See also MILLER at 110-136.
169. MILLER at 134-136.
170. The system employed in Michigan and Wisconsin (remands for
any preliminary hearing waived without counsel) has been mentioned.
See note 161 supra.
171. See note 33 supra and accompanying text.
172. See note 86 supra and accompanying text.
173. One study has revealed the nature of the pressures, some subtle,
some otherwise, which may be brought to bear on accused to secure a
waiver. See MILLER at 117-123.
appoint counsel before the preliminary hearing.174
The accused may also waive his right to a preliminary hearing
by pleading guilty to the warrant. 1 5 The problem here is that
since the defendant may later plead not guilty, his original pleadihg
without counsel waives his right to the preliminary hearing, and
the protection of White v. Maryland176 does not cure this diffi-
culty. As in the case of the express waiver without counsel, this
sub silentio waiver would now appear to stand on dangerous
ground.
Secondly, in many instances an indictment by a grand jury, or
even an information by the prosecutor, will obviate the preliminary
hearing.177 The United States Supreme Court has apparently ac-
knowledged this procedure without finding it exceptionable.' 78 In-
deed, there is some evidence that the practice of prosecutors in de-
laying the preliminary hearing in order to get a superseding indict-
ment is widespread.
17"
Summary: There is no constitutional right to a preliminary
hearing, and under current practices it may be waived with or
without the advice of counsel. Furthermore, in many jurisdictions,
the preliminary hearing is obviated when the grand jury returns
an indictment, and in some jurisdictions the filing of an in-
formation also supersedes the proceeding on the complaint.
174. See MOORE % 5.03 at 5-28 (1969).
175. See MILLER at 117-118, 117 n.28. See also MOORE 5.03 at 5-27,
5-27 n.2. This practice is more de facto than de jure, since the statutes
do not provide that a guilty plea shall waive the hearing.
176. See note 8 supra and accompanying text.
177. The variety of situations is large. The Federal Magistrates Act,
18 U.S.C. § 3060 (e) (1968), provides that an indictment or an information
supersedes the prospective preliminary hearing. But since under FED. R.
CalM. P. 7 the United States can only proceed by information with the con-
sent of the accused in open court, counsel will be present to advise the de-
fendant. Thus, only the indictment is likely to foreclose the preliminary
hearing. Missouri presents another version, apparently, in that only the
indictment can foreclose the hearing. Mo. ANN. STAT. § 544.250 (1953); Mo.
CRaM. P.R. 23.02. In California neither indictment nor information fore-
close the hearing. CAL. PENAL CODE § 860 (West 1970). This would ap-
pear to be the case in Pennsylvania, with minor exceptions. See Stein,
Preliminary Hearings in Pennsylvania, A Closer Look, 30 U. Pir. L. REV.
481, 484, 486-487 (1969). "Mooting" of preliminary hearings by super-
seding indictments may be more common in the federal system than among
the states. HALL at 842, 847, 848. But see notes 139, 144 supra and ac-
companying text.
178. Jaben v. United States, 381 U.S. 214 (1965):
Furthermore, we think that the government must proceed through
the further steps of the complaint procedure by affording the de-
fendant a preliminary hearing as required by Rule 5 [Federal Rules
of Criminal Procedure], unless before the preliminary hearing is
held, the grand jury supersedes the complaint proceeding by re-
turning an indictment ....
Id. at 220. See Lem Woon v. Oregon, 229 U.S. 586 (1913) (a pre-Rules deci-
sion to the same effect but where an information was used in place of the
indictment). See also HALL at 848.





Neither the various statements and restatements of the Chap-
man rule by the Supreme Court nor the subsequent history of the
applications of the rule, are likely to give more than very general
guidance to a court seeking to apply the Chapman rule to fact situa-
tions like that in Coleman. It is further submitted that the Cole-
man Court's remand direction to Wade and Gilbert is likely to prove
of limited value not only because of the widely different fact situa-
tions in those cases, but primarily because of the incomparability
between line-ups and preliminary hearings. 8 0
It was suggested that in those jurisdictions 81 where the scope
of the preliminary hearing is severely limited it would be possible
to argue that failure to appoint counsel was harmless error, since
the accused's opportunities to examine witnesses or discover the
state's case were minimal. It has also been noted that if it were
doubtful that this argument could succeed, states could at least
save the expense of appointing counsel at future hearings by re-
stricting the scope of the hearing in a way which would effectively
eliminate the accused's affirmative advantages. And, finally, an
even more drastic solution to the problem would be to eliminate the
preliminary hearing altogether, since it is not constitutionally re-
quired, or arrange the indictment process to obviate the hearing as
desired. It is suggested that if the forebodings of Mr. Justice White
materialize, the effect of Coleman v. Alabama will be ironic indeed:
I therefore join in the opinion of the court, but with
some hesitation, since requiring the appointment of coun-
sel may result in fewer preliminary hearings in jurisdic-
tions where the prosecutor is free to avoid them by taking
a case directly to the grand jury. Our ruling may also in-
vite eliminating the preliminary hearing system entirely.18 2
It has been repeatedly stated that the preliminary hearing was
devised to benefit the defendant; 88 that elimination of the hearing
may lead to arrests for investigation;8 4 that the preliminary hear-
ing affords the accused greater protection against unfounded prose-
cutions than the grand jury; 1 5 and that the preliminary hearing
180. For a more detailed analysis see discussion under Section II D
of this Note svpra.
181. Such as Pennsylvania. See notes 99, 125, 129, 133, and 153 supra
and accompanving text.
182. U.S. at , 90 S. Ct. at 2008 (concurring opinion).
183. See, e.g., State v. Bloomer, 197 Kan. 668, 671-672, 421 P.2d 58,
62 (1966); Kardy v. Shook, 237 Md. 524, 543, 207 A.2d 83, 93-94 (1965);
Thies v. State, 178 Wis. 98, 103, 189 N.W. 539, 541 (1922). See also CIPES
§ 8.12 at 8-14 to 8-15; Weinberg at 1365.
184. See MOORE 5.04 at 5-30 n.1 (statement of Prof. A. Kenneth Pye).
185. See Weinberg at 1379-86; Note, Felony Information: Due Process
has become an integral part of traditional due process through in-
corporation of fundamental common law rights.
18 6
Furthermore, it was suggested earlier that on two previous oc-
casions 8 7 when the Court found a stage of the criminal proceeding
to be "critical," the nature of the stage was distinguishable from
the situation in Coleman because alternatives to the presence of
counsel were invited by the Court, and because the particular stage
(police interrogation, line-up) was more likely to prove dangerous
than beneficial to the accused. It is unlikely that abolition of police
interrogations or line-ups would be considered detrimental to the
rights of the defendant. But it was suggested that the preliminary
hearing is not a comparable stage because the Court rested its de-
termination in Coleman largely on asserted advantages to the ac-
cused, and because no reasonable alternative to counsel at the pre-
liminary hearing is imaginable.
Consequently, if the decision in Coleman leads to abolition or
contraction of the preliminary hearing, the result would appear to
be a net loss to the accused; a result clearly at odds with the objec-
tives of the Coleman opinion. Yet the Court did not suggest that
there is now a constitutional right to a preliminary hearing.8 8
Nor did it suggest that its characterization of the preliminary hear-
ing was meant to be other than descriptive. The Court would ap-
pear to be in a dilemma: either it must now hold that the prelimi-
nary hearing is constitutionally required, and define a constitu-
tionally conforming hearing, or it may find itself in the position of
having declared that counsel must be present to exploit defense
opportunities which have disappeared. And in the latter alterna-
tive, it is submitted, the Court will find itself left with what




and Preliminary Hearing on Probable Cause, 42 WASH. L. REv. 903 (1966-
67).
186. CIP s § 8.14 at 8-15 to 8-16.
187. United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967); Miranda v. Arizona,
384 U.S. 436 (1966).
188. In fact, the Court noted in passing that the Alabama preliminary
hearing was optional with the prosecutor. U.S. at , 90 S. Ct. at 2002.
189. ROBERTSON, ESSAYS IN MONETARY THEORY 25 (1940).
